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Abstract 
This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, 
abatement R&D, and market imperfections.  We compare the economic performances under 
three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax 
recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling.  It is found that the benefit arising from 
the private conduct of abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is 
greater.  With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by 
which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement 
R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.   
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1. Introduction 
 An important environmental problem facing policy-makers concerns how to 
reconcile sustainable growth with limited pollution.  On the one hand, endogenous 
growth theory requires that most economic factors grow unlimitedly. On the other 
hand, if pollution, an input or a by-product of output, were to grow to become 
infinitely large, any life or economic activities could hardly exist.  To ensure 
sustainable growth, it is therefore essential for pollution to be abated within a 
survivable level in the long run.  In the US, for example, the estimated total annual 
abatement expenditure represents between 1.5% and 2.5% of GDP (Berman and Bui, 
2001).  
 Recent studies dealing with the relationship between pollution abatement and 
environmental growth, such as van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1995), Bovenberg and 
Smulders (1995, 1996) and Fullerton and Kim (2008), treat abatement as technology 
or knowledge that could be accumulated and developed in a separate sector (i.e., the 
environmental R&D sector). 1   Since knowledge is non-rival and has the 
characteristic of a public good, the costs associated with the use of abatement 
knowledge as an input are zero, while knowledge creation and accumulation, by 
contrast, require rival inputs and are costly.2  This implies that, as stressed in 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), in a perfectly competitive market abatement R&D 
could not be rewarded so that no innovation in abatement technologies would be 
undertaken without the government’s intervention.  Therefore, this strand of the 
literature essentially assumes that abatement R&D activities are publicly conducted 
by the government.3 
                                                 
1
 Alternatively, some studies treat abatement spending as a flow variable which cannot be accumulated. 
See Gradus and Smulders (1993), Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), Smulders and Gradus (1996), and 
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997). 
2
 See Smulders (1995) for a detailed discussion.  
3
 One exception is van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1995), in which the accumulation of abatement 
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 In reality, however, we often observe that private and public abatement activities 
coexist.  Moreover, it is usually observed that abatement technologies are developed 
and produced in a private upstream sector, which then sells abatement equipment (or 
blueprints) to downstream polluting industries (OECD, 2000; Greaker and Rosendahl, 
2008).  In the US, the private abatement investment is even greater than the public 
abatement investment (OECD, 2007, Table 3).4  Based on these observations, it is 
quite fair to say that a satisfactory model should be able to consider both possibilities 
of public and private abatement R&D.  This is what we aim to do in this paper.  To 
be more precise, we build up a theoretical framework which enables us to compare 
economic performance under the private and public abatement investment regimes. 
 Another key feature of our model is that we introduce imperfect competition in 
the intermediate good market.  As mentioned above, private abatement R&D 
requires incentives, which are not available in a perfect market because, if they were, 
the competitive firms would not be left with any quasi-rent for abatement R&D.  
Hence, we should resort to a different market structure, such as an imperfectly 
competitive market.  In the 1980s, several studies (e.g., Hart, 1982; Mankiw, 1985; 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987) noted that market power in the private sector plays a 
crucial role in the performance of government policy.  More recently, Judd (2002) 
has also argued that imperfect competition is a key feature of dynamic modern 
economies.  The empirical evidence, on the other hand, suggests that polluting 
industries are often equipped with monopoly power (Beccarello, 1996; Considine, 
2001).  To reflect the observed facts, a considerable body of studies have developed 
environmental economic models which take market imperfections into account (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                            
capital is costless (a byproduct of the accumulation of human capital); thus private abatement takes 
place even without policy intervention.  As is evident, our model’s structure is completely different 
from theirs.  Furthermore, van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1995) do not deal with public abatement 
investment. 
4
 See Hatzipanayotou et al. (2005) for more detailed discussions on private and public abatement in the 
US and the UK.  
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Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002; Greaker and Rosendahl, 2008; Chang et al., 2009).  
 Following in the footsteps of these studies, this paper develops an environmental 
endogenous-growth model that features market imperfections.  More specifically, the 
market structure we consider is characterized by three vertically-integrated sectors. 
Abatement technologies are developed in an upstream sector, which sells the 
abatement knowledge (ideas) to the intermediate sector.  The intermediate sector, 
which generates pollution, can generate a positive profit by exhibiting monopoly 
power, but it has to pay fees to the upstream sector for the right to use the abatement 
knowledge.  The perfectly competitive downstream sector produces a single final 
output by employing intermediate inputs.  Under such a setting, we are able to deal 
with various regimes including public abatement (hereafter, GA), private abatement 
without tax recycling (PA), and private abatement with tax recycling (PAR) regimes.  
Moreover, we compare the relative superiority in terms of economic growth and 
social welfare among various regimes.  In particular, we highlight whether market 
imperfections play an important role in determining the relative superiority. 
 An interesting issue in this paper is whether the private provision of abatement 
knowledge leads to a higher growth rate than public abatement.  Our analysis shows 
that the answer crucially depends on two factors, namely, the monopoly power of the 
polluting firms and the type of government spending.  We find that the greater the 
degree of the firms’ monopoly power, the larger will be the benefit arising from the 
private implementation of abatement.  The reason for this result is that the incentive 
for the upstream sector to engage in R&D is precisely determined by the intermediate 
firms’ profit.  It is also found that growth will be enhanced if the government 
distributes its tax revenues to boost (or directly engage in) abatement R&D.  This 
finding implies that if environmental tax revenues are used to provide public goods or 
other private services, a subsidy on private R&D abatement will possibly be a good 
 4 
choice to achieve higher economic growth and social welfare. 
 The analysis of this paper is also related to recent studies on the effect of 
environmental taxation on economic growth.  The conventional wisdom in the 
literature (e.g., Huang and Cai, 1994; Ligthart and van der Ploeg, 1994; Grimaud, 
1999) is often that there is an unavoidable conflict between economic growth and the 
conservation of the environment in the economy.  However, in recent years a 
growing body of literature that proposes a positive growth effect of environmental 
taxation has accumulated.  For example, in their frequently cited article, Bovenberg 
and Smulders (1995) find that environmental taxation has an ambiguous effect on 
economic growth by assuming that environmental quality is beneficial to input 
productivity.5  In departing from this strand of the literature, our analysis assumes 
that the polluting inputs are purchased from abroad at a non-bargaining price.  
Accordingly, a higher environmental tax will reduce the pollution by way of an 
accumulation of abatement R&D, but the polluting inputs will remain unchanged.  
Since an environmental tax does not decrease the level of polluting inputs (and 
thereby the marginal productivities of other inputs), it undoubtedly spurs economic 
growth through the positive environmental productivity effect.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the model 
and solves the firms’ and households’ optimization problems.  Section 3 deals with 
three distinct regimes associated with different abatement policies.  Section 4 
presents our numerical results and compares the growth rates and the welfare levels 
among the three regimes.  The final section presents some concluding remarks.  
Technical derivations are relegated to the Appendix. 
                                                 
5
 Other justifications contributing to a positive (ambiguous) environmental tax effect on economic 
growth include a positive externality of abatement activities (Smulders and Gradus, 1996), an elastic 
labor supply (Hettich, 1998; Chen et al., 2003), the international accumulation of environmental assets 
(Ono, 2003), tax revenues recycled to subsidize intermediate goods R&D (van Zon and Yetkiner, 2003; 
Nakada, 2004), and the existence of an indeterminate equilibrium path (Itaya, 2008). 
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2. The model 
The economy we consider is composed of three parts: the households, the 
production sectors, and the government.  The production sectors are characterized by 
a perfectly competitive market for final goods and a monopolistically competitive 
market for intermediate goods.  Moreover, intermediate firms invest in abatement 
R&D to improve pollution reduction technology.  In what follows, we in turn 
describe the structure of the economy. 
2.1. Production sectors 
In line with Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), the 
production side of the economy consists of two sectors: a perfectly competitive final 
good sector and a monopolistically competitive intermediate goods sector.  There is 
a continuum of intermediate goods iy , ]1,0[∈i , which are used by a single 
representative firm to produce a final good Y .  Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
we specify that the production of the final good exhibits the following constant 
returns-to-scale technology:  
  
1
1 11
0 i
Y y di θθ −− =   ∫ ,   )1,0[∈θ .        (1) 
As we will show later, θ  indexes the degree of monopoly of the intermediate good 
firms. 
Let Ypi  denote the profit of the final good firm and iq  be the price of the ith 
intermediate good in terms of final output.6  The maximization problem of the final 
good firm can be expressed as: 
  
1
1 111
0 0i
Y i i iy
Max y di q y diθθpi −− = −  ∫ ∫ ,       (2) 
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 It should be noted that the final good is treated as the numeraire in this paper. 
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The first-order condition for this problem yields the demand function of the ith 
intermediate good: 
  ( ) Yqy ii θ
1
−
= .            (3) 
It is quite clear from Eq. (3) that the demand function of the ith intermediate good has 
a constant price elasticity θ/1 .  When 0=θ , intermediate goods are perfect 
substitutes in the production of the final good, implying that the intermediate goods 
sector is perfectly competitive.  However, if 10 <<θ , intermediate good firms face 
a downward-sloping demand curve so that they can exert monopoly power.  Since 
the main concern of our paper lies in the mutual interactions among environmental 
externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections, in the following analysis we 
focus our attention on the case in which 10 <<θ .  
Based on the fact that the final market is perfectly competitive, substituting Eq. 
(3) into Eq. (2) and imposing the zero-profit condition yields: 
  
11
0
1iq di
θ
θ
−
=∫ .            (4) 
The technology for producing the ith intermediate good is given by: 
  0)(,)( 1 >′= − NAlekNAy yiiii βαα ,        (5)7 
where A is an environment-productivity function, N  is environmental quality, and 
ik , yil  and ie  are the capital, labor and emission inputs used by the ith intermediate 
firm, respectively.  To reflect the positive production externality arising from the 
environmental quality, Eq. (5) specifies that the output level of the intermediate goods 
rises with a better natural environment.  The profit function of the ith intermediate 
firm ipi  can then be expressed as: 
                                                 
7
 It is worth noting that in a monopolistically competitive market, although the production function is 
in an increasing-returns-to-scale form, this does not necessarily imply negative profits as long as the 
monopoly power θ is large enough (see, e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994).  In fact, as will be seen 
later in our numerical example, the profit-output ratio of an intermediate firm is around 2.8%.  
 7 
  iPyiiiiii plmerkyq τωpi −−−−= ,       (6) 
where r is the capital rental rate, ω  is the real wage, m is the price of the polluting 
input, and Pτ  denotes a tax (or price of permits) that the government levies on actual 
pollution ip .  We assume that this environmental tax evolves with the aggregate 
capital, i.e., P Kτ τ= , where τ  is a (constant) policy parameter. 8   It is also 
assumed that the intermediate firm purchases polluting input ie  from abroad so that 
the input price m is treated as exogenous throughout the paper (e.g., the polluting 
input can be thought of as if it were petroleum). 
2.2. Environmental quality 
The pollution generated in the production process of the ith intermediate firm is 
of the form: 
  
ε
1


=
H
ep ii ,            (7) 
where H  is the stock of abatement knowledge, and 1/ε  ( 0>ε ) is the elasticity of 
pollution production with respect to “abated polluting inputs”.  In Eq. (7), pollution 
is specified to be positively related to polluting input ie  and negatively related to 
abatement knowledge H.  Accordingly, the total pollution P in the economy is the 
sum of polluting emissions generated by all intermediate firms: 
  
1
0 i
P p di= ∫ .            (8) 
Following Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) 
and Fullerton and Kim (2008), the natural environment is treated as a renewable 
                                                 
8
 To prevent the aggregate pollution from growing to infinity (in which case nothing could survive), 
we have to assume that the environmental tax grows over time.  This is a commonly used assumption 
in the literature on environmental and endogenous growth (see, e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; 
Nielsen et al., 1995; Ono, 2007; Fullerton and Kim, 2008).  Smulders (1995) provides a detailed 
discussion on this point.  As for the realistic concern, the effective tax rates on fuel oil, coal and gas 
increased gradually during the period 1988-2006 in many European countries (Andersen and Ekins, 
2009). 
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resource, and can hence be specified to grow and deplete in the following manner:   
  PNbNN −−= )1( ,          (9) 
where a dot denotes the rate of change with respect to time, b is a parameter that 
captures the degree of ecological regeneration, and the term )1( NbN −  reflects the 
regeneration capacity of the environment, which might initially increase with a larger 
N but will eventually decline when N exceeds a threshold value.  Eq. (9) indicates 
that a rise in the level of pollution is associated with a decline in environmental 
quality in the next period.  In the steady state, the environmental quality remains 
constant over time since pollution equals the regeneration capacity of the environment 
( ))1( NbNP −= . 
We restrict our analysis to a symmetric equilibrium in which kki = , eei = , 
yyi ll = , ppi = , pipi =i , yyi = , and qqi =  for all i.  As a result, from Eq. (1) 
we have 
1
1 11
0 i
Y y di yθθ −− = =  ∫ .  With iyy =  and qqi = , the profit of the final 
good firm stated in Eq. (2) can then be expressed by yqY )1( −=pi .  Given that the 
final good sector is perfectly competitive, the representative final good firm earns 
zero profit (i.e., 0=Ypi ) in equilibrium.  Accordingly, the zero-profit condition in 
the final good sector 0=Ypi  requires that 1=q .  Furthermore, let K , E , and yL  
denote the aggregate capital stock, aggregate emission, and aggregate labor hired by 
the intermediate firms.  Then, we have: 
1
0 i
K k di k= =∫ , 10 iE e di e= =∫ , 
1
0y yi y
L l di l= =∫ .  As a consequence, the intermediate firms’ first-order conditions 
can be arranged as:  
  r
K
Y
=− αθ )1( ,           (10) 
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1(1 )(1 ) P
Y
m HP
P
εθ α ε τ ε −− − = + ,        (11) 
  ωβθ =−
yL
Y)1( .           (12) 
Eqs. (10)-(12) indicate that, given the environmental quality and abatement 
knowledge, firms equate the marginal revenue of the capital, pollution and labor to 
their respective marginal cost.  Of particular note, the right-hand side of Eq. (11) 
represents the marginal cost of pollution, and contains two parts.  The first part is the 
environmental tax implemented by the government pτ .  The second part means that, 
in addition to the taxation, in raising one unit of pollution the firm needs to purchase 
1HPεε −  units of the dirty input, and thus pay the cost 1m HPεε − .  It follows from Eq. 
(11) that a larger abatement knowledge raises the marginal cost of pollution; thereby 
reducing the use of it.9 
2.3. Households 
There is a continuum of identical infinitely lived households, each of which 
derives positive utility from both consumption C and environmental quality N. 
Population is stationary and normalized to unity for simplicity.  The representative 
household utility is given by: 
  
1
0
( ) 1
exp[ ]
1
CNW t dt
η σ
ρσ
−
∞ −
= −
−∫ ,        (13) 
where W  is the discounted lifetime utility of the representative household, ρ  is the 
subjective time preference rate, σ  is the intertemporal substitution elasticity, and η  
denotes the weight in terms of the utility attached to the environment or, as proposed 
by Fullerton and Kim (2008), the “consumption externality” in relation to the 
environment.  
                                                 
9
 It is equivalent if the firm chooses the dirty input e instead of pollution p.  In this case, Eq. (11) 
should be rewritten as 1(1 )(1 ) / /PY E P H mεθ α τ ε−− − = + .  Then, by imposing E P Hε=  we can 
obtain the same result as reported in Eq. (11). 
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Each household is endowed with a fixed amount of labor L , which is allocated 
to production between the intermediate goods ( yL ) and research ( HL ).  We assume 
that labor is homogeneous and perfectly mobile across sectors.  A unique wage rate 
must, as a result, hold.  The representative household receives income by supplying 
labor and capital services to firms.  In addition, it receives profits pi  (in the form of 
dividends) and lump-sum transfers G  from the government.  Finally, a capital 
income tax rate Kτ  is levied on the capital rentals.  Accordingly, the budget 
constraint faced by the representative household can be expressed as: 
  CGLKrK K −+++−= piωτ )1( .        (14) 
The optimum conditions for the representative household with respect to consumption 
and physical capital are: 
  λσησ =−− )1(NC ,           (15) 
  rK )1(/ τρλλ −−= ,          (16) 
where λ  is the shadow price of the private capital stock. 
2.4. Abatement R&D activity 
As noted earlier, pollution abatement technologies are regarded as knowledge 
and can thus be accumulated over time.  The creation of knowledge requires efforts 
and time so that innovation and invention are acts of investment (Smulders, 1995).  
In line with Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), we assume that new ideas are developed 
by the labor input and the existing stock of ideas.  To be more precise, abatement 
knowledge H is specified to be created in the following manner: 
  HLH Hδ= ,            (17) 
where δ  is a productivity parameter and HL  denotes the labor input for R&D 
activities.  
In our model, for long-run growth to be feasible and sustainable, the balanced 
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growth path (BGP) in the steady state is characterized by: 
  0, ======= PNg
E
E
H
H
K
K
C
C
Y
Y


,      (18) 
where environmental quality and pollution are limited in a physical sense, and all 
other economic variables grow at a common constant endogenous growth rate g. 
 
3. Public versus private abatement  
 Two possible facts concerning the R&D activities and the government budget 
constraint are considered in this section.  First, the R&D activities can be conducted 
by either private firms or the government.  Second, if the R&D activities are engaged 
in by private firms, the government may or may not subsidize the R&D activities.  
Based on these two kinds of possibility, our analysis can be classified into three 
different regimes: public abatement (GA), private abatement without tax recycling 
(PA), and private abatement with tax recycling (PAR).  Since the government budget 
constraint varies with each of the three regimes, the BGP may display quite 
contrasting results among these three regimes.  In what follows, we discuss three 
types of regimes in turn. 
3.1. Public abatement 
Under the GA regime, the R&D activities are engaged in by the government.   
Under such a situation, the balanced budget constraint faced by the government can 
be expressed as follows: 
  PrKHqG PKH ττ +=+  ,          (19) 
where new abatement knowledge H  is produced according to Eq. (17), and Hq  is 
the price of abatement knowledge relative to final goods.  Eq. (19) states that the 
government receives its revenues in the form of capital taxes rKKτ  and pollution 
taxes PPτ  to finance its provision of lump-sum transfer payments to the household 
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G  and public abatement investment HqH  .  
Eq. (19) is consistent with the Fullerton and Kim (2008) specification, in which 
abatement knowledge is regarded as a public good and can be used freely by firms.  
Notice that since labor is perfectly mobile, the marginal revenue product of labor 
should be the same between two sectors.  That is: 
H
H
y L
Hq
L
Y
∂
∂=−
βθ )1( .          (20) 
Using Eqs. (17), (19), and (20) together with the household budget constraint 
yields the resource constraint of the economy: 
mECYK −−= .           (21) 
Imposing the conditions for a BGP and defining the following transformed 
variables: KHh /= , KCc /= , Kw /ω= , and KG /=φ , the macroeconomy 
along the BGP equilibrium can then be described by the following set of equations: 
  
(1 ) 11 (1 )(1 ) ( )K yg A N P h Lα ε α βτ θ α ρσ
∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ − ∗ = − − −  ,    (22) 
  )( ∗∗ −= yLLg δ ,           (23) 
  
εβαεα ετεαθ ∗∗∗∗−∗−∗∗ +=−− PmhPLhPNA y
1)1()()1)(1( ,    (24) 
  
∗∗∗−∗−∗∗
=− yy LwLhPNA
βαεαβθ 1)1()()1( ,       (25) 
  
εβαεα ∗∗∗∗−∗−∗∗∗
−−= PmhgLhPNAc y
1)1()( ,      (26) 
  )1( ∗∗∗ −= NbNP ,           (27) 
  )()()1( 1)1( ∗∗∗∗−∗−∗∗ −+=+− yyK LLwPLhPNA φταθτ βαεα ,   (28) 
where the superscript “*” denotes the steady-state value.   
The macroeconomic model expressed in the above seven equations determines 
seven unknowns, i.e., ∗h , ∗c , ∗P , ∗N , ∗yL , 
∗w , and ∗g .  Since the system is in a 
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nonlinear form and is too complicated to enable a closed-form solution to be obtained, 
we present our results via numerical analysis. 
3.2. Private abatement R&D 
This subsection deals with both the PA and PAR regimes.  Under these two 
regimes, the R&D activities are undertaken by private firms.  Accordingly, we first 
need to formulate how abatement knowledge is produced in the R&D sector.  To 
achieve this purpose, in line with the standard R&D literature including Romer (1990) 
and Jones (1995), we assume that there are three vertically-integrated sectors in this 
economy.  The abatement technology is developed and produced in an upstream 
R&D sector, which hires labor to engage in innovation activity and then sell the 
abatement technology (blueprints) to the midstream intermediate (polluting) sector.  
The downstream final good sector produces a single final output by employing a set 
of intermediate inputs.  
 In the R&D sector, at each moment there exists an R&D firm producing and 
selling the license for the right to use the abatement technology.  It is the firm that 
makes the latest development, namely, the state-of-the-art technology for H .10  The 
R&D firm hires labor HL  to develop the abatement technology according to the 
production function reported in Eq. (17).  The profit function of the R&D firm is: 
  (1 )H H Hq H s Lpi ω= − − ,          (29)11 
                                                 
10
 In the vast literature on R&D-based growth models, the products of R&D (knowledge or blueprint) 
are not homogeneous but sector-specific.  A blueprint may relate to a new variety or a better quality of 
a given variety, but in any case it will be used by a unique monopolist.  This implies that there are 
many firms in the R&D sector and the number of firms is determined by the zero profit condition.  In 
the present paper, however, the abatement technology is a homogeneous good.  Hence, for the R&D 
sector to be able to extract all the profits of the intermediate firms (as will be assumed below), it must 
be the case that at each moment there is only one firm that sells the abatement technology.  We would 
like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 
11
 Since the technology is non-rival, the marginal cost of supplying H  to one more intermediate firm 
is zero.  This means that the R&D sector will sell its product to each and all of the intermediate firms.  
Therefore, in Eq. (29) the revenues of the R&D sector should be 
Hx q H  where x  denotes the number 
of the intermediate firms.  Notice that we have assumed 1x =  and thus x is ignored in Eq.(29). 
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where s  is the subsidy rate for the labor employment of the R&D sector. 
Following the literature on R&D-based endogenous growth models (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), two important assumptions are 
made.  First, there is free entry into the R&D sector so that the R&D firm earns zero 
profit.12  Second, the R&D sector has pricing power; it charges a price for its product 
(blueprint) at which the intermediate firms are indifferent between buying the 
blueprint (to produce the intermediate product) and not buying it (to leave the market).  
Accordingly, in each period the price of technology Hq  must be set to the level at 
which the technology generated in the R&D sector extracts all the profit of the 
intermediate firms, which can be expressed by: 
  
1
0H i
q H dipi pi= =∫ .           (30)13 
Eq. (30) says that the license fee for new abatement knowledge must be equal to the 
net profit that a monopolistic firm can earn.14  Notice that because we have a 
continuum of (both R&D and intermediate) firms in the interval (0,1) , the total 
payment to the R&D sector is the sum of all intermediate firms’ profits.   
 Under the PA regime, the government does not subsidize R&D activities, and 
hence this regime corresponds to 0=s  in Eq. (29).  Alternatively, under the PAR 
regime, the government provides R&D subsidies, and hence this regime is associated 
with 0>s  in Eq. (29).  We now deal with these two regimes in turn. 
3.2.1. Private abatement R&D without tax recycling 
                                                 
12
 As pointed out in Grossman and Helpman (1991), this assumption implicitly supposes that potential 
entrants or outsiders can, via inspection of the goods in the market, completely learn about the state of 
knowledge (due to the public-good characteristics of knowledge) to mount their own research efforts 
and then replace the existing R&D firm. 
13
 In the standard R&D-based endogenous models, the intermediate firms make a one-off payment to 
the R&D sector for the right to use the knowledge forever after.  However, in our model the 
intermediate firms need to make flow payments to use the abatement knowledge in every period.  In 
subsection 5.1 we will discuss this point more in detail. 
14
 According to Kamien and Tauman (1986), a patentee can license her invention to an oligopolistic 
industry by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty.  It should be noted that in this paper the price of 
abatement knowledge
 
can be regarded as a fixed license fee that an intermediate firm should pay to the 
R&D sector in exchange for the right to use abatement knowledge.   
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 Under the PA regime, the government neither invests in R&D nor subsidizes it 
(i.e., 0=s ).  Hence, the government budget constraint is given by: 
  PrKG PK ττ += .           (31) 
Since the profit of the intermediate firms is allocated to pay for the use of abatement 
knowledge, no dividends are distributed to the households.  Accordingly, the 
household budget constraint can be rewritten as: 
  CGLrKK K −++−= ωτ )1( .         (32) 
Based on the above conditions, it can be shown that the resource constraint reported 
in Eq. (21) still holds in the PA regime.  At the BGP equilibrium, the economy is 
described by Eqs. (22)-(27) together with the following condition (mathematical 
derivations are provided in Appendix A): 
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3.2.2. Private abatement R&D with tax recycling 
 Under the PAR regime, the government subsidizes the private abatement R&D 
instead of directly conducting the R&D activities.  Hence, the government budget 
constraint becomes: 
  PrKLsG PKH ττω +=+ .         (34) 
After some manipulations, Eqs. (33) and (34) can be modified as: 
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  )()()1( **1)1( yyK LLwsPLhPNA −+=+− ∗∗∗
−∗−∗∗ φταθτ βαεα .   (36) 
The BGP economy can then be described by Eqs. (22)-(27), (35), and (36), where 
eight unknowns ∗h , ∗c , ∗P , ∗N , ∗yL , 
∗w , ∗g , and ∗s  are solved in eight 
equations. 
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4. Quantitative results  
A numerical analysis is presented in this section to trace how the growth rate and 
welfare level will react following a change in an environmental policy under the three 
regimes.  To construct an illustrative example, we choose benchmark parameter 
values that are within the plausible ranges used in the literature.  Table 1 lists the 
benchmark parameter values, and some interpretations concerning these parameter 
configurations should be provided here.  First, in line with Fullerton and Kim (2008), 
we specify the environmental productivity function as being of the form γNNA =)(  
and set the following parameters: 77.0=γ , 24.0=α , 04.0=b , 7.0=η .  Second, 
the values 5.1=σ , 67.0=β , and 05.0=ρ  are based on the calibration exercises 
in Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).  The monopoly power index 
0.35θ =  is calibrated such that the resulting profit ratio in our economy is 2.8%, and 
conforms to the profit ratio of a typical US industry; see, e.g., Basu and Fernald (1997) 
and Guo and Lansing (1999).15  
 
Table 1 : Baseline parameters 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
α  
σ  
ε  
γ  
Kτ  
τ  
m  
b  
0.24 
1.5 
0.6 
0.77 
0.16 
30 
1.8 
0.04 
β  
ρ  
η  
θ  
φ  
δ  
L  
0.67 
0.05 
0.7 
0.35 
0.06 
0.01 
15 
 
Third, to reflect the model’s plausibility we choose 16.0=Kτ  (based on the 
                                                 
15
 We choose the GA regime as our baseline economy when calibrating. 
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estimate reported by Auerbach, 1996) and 0.06φ =  as policy parameters.  This in 
turn implies that the government’s spending as a proportion of output is around 8%, 
and hence this numerical value lies within the reasonable interval in the literature (see 
e.g., Gali, 1994).  Fourth, the pollution tax relative to the capital stock KP /ττ =  is 
30 so that the ratio between the tax revenues and output is about 17%.16  Fifth, as for 
the pollution conversion parameter, while Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) simply 
assume that ε  is equal to 1, Fullerton and Kim (2008), however, relax this 
assumption and allow ε  to vary from 0.6 to 0.9.  A relatively low value of ε  
means that the elasticity of pollution production with respect to “abated polluting 
inputs” is high.  That is, raising the level of polluting inputs will not only increase 
pollution, but will also accelerate the generation process.  More specifically, the 
investment in abatement knowledge will be more important if the elasticity is higher.  
To highlight the role of abatement investment, we set 6.0=ε  as our parameter value.  
Finally, the values of ),,( Lm δ  are calibrated so that the balanced growth rate is 
3.12%, which is close to the average growth rate for the past 30 years in the US.  
4.1. Comparison of three regimes 
Table 2 presents the key endogenous variables in the benchmark case.  Our goal 
is to compare the steady state growth rate and the welfare level under the three 
regimes.  As shown in Table 2, in the GA regime, the steady state growth rate is 
about 3.12%.  In the PA regime, the government switches the abatement spending to 
a lump-sum transfer, and the intermediate firms are forced to purchase the license fee 
for abatement knowledge from the R&D firms.  Under such an arrangement, the 
growth rate declines to 1.43% in response.  However, if the tax revenues are recycled 
to subsidize the R&D sector, the growth rate of 3.55% is ranked the highest among 
                                                 
16
 Supposing that K = 1, in the steady state we have P = 0.0042 and Y = 0.7383. Accordingly, the ratio 
of pollution tax revenues to output is (30)(0.0042)/0.7383 = 17%, which is in line with the value 17.8% 
in Fullerton and Kim (2008).  
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the three regimes.  In addition, as shown in Table 2, the rank of the abatement 
knowledge among the three regimes is the same as that of the balanced growth rate.  
The intuition behind this coincident ranking follows from the fact that, as indicated in 
Eq. (17), an accumulation of abatement knowledge unambiguously enhances 
economic growth.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of three regimes 
 Environmental 
quality 
Pollution Abatement 
knowledge 
Growth 
rate (%) 
Welfare 
GA 0.8809 0.00420 2.2964 3.116 -1.0372 
PA 0.9007 0.00358 1.4722 1.427 -14.7173 
PAR 0.8779 0.00429 2.5635 3.554 -0.6392 
 
However, by comparing the value of pollution under the three regimes, it may be 
somewhat surprising that a higher abatement investment is associated with more 
pollution.  The economic intuition behind this result can be explained as follows.  
Other things being equal, a better environment (less pollution) should be achieved if 
the firm has access to more abatement knowledge.  However, once the government 
directly provides or indirectly subsidizes abatement knowledge, the cost of 
pollution-reducing activities will decline.  Cheaper abatement knowledge gives the 
firms an incentive to use more polluting inputs, which worsen the environmental 
quality.  In our model, it seems that the latter effect dominates the former, and thus 
abatement knowledge and pollution receive the same ranking among the three 
regimes. 
We now turn to compare the level of welfare under the three regimes.  We focus 
on the welfare along the BGP, denoted by ∗W , which is calculated by using Eqs. (13) 
and (26): 
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level of consumption on the BGP, and 0K  is the initial (predetermined) capital stock.  
Without loss of generality, we set K0 = 1 in our numerical model.  We follow Barro 
(1990) to assume that the economy jumps to the BGP right from the beginning, which 
means that given a predetermined initial amount of capital 0K , the levels of all 
endogenous variables (including 0C ) are simultaneously determined.  This 
assumption implies that the level of welfare expressed in Eq. (37) does not consider 
the transition dynamics and thus our quantitative results only apply to the BGP. 
 The numerical values of social welfare under the three regimes are reported in 
the last column of Table 2.  It is clear that the ranking of the level of welfare among 
the three regimes is the PAR regime, the GA regime and the PA regime in that order.  
The policy implication is that, given the baseline parameter values, the growth rate 
and welfare are the lowest if abatement activities are conducted privately without 
government intervention.  Nevertheless, they could be both enhanced once the 
government engages in public abatement or provides incentives for private abatement 
R&D.  If the latter is the case, the growth rate and welfare could achieve the highest 
levels.   
4.2. Parameters with policy implications 
It should be noted that the numerical results regarding the growth rate and 
welfare are examined only under the baseline parameter values.  An interesting 
concern is how our numerical results are related to the values of the parameters.  To 
this end, in what follows we propose three relevant parameters that need to be 
considered by the policy-makers. 
4.2.1. Market imperfection 
 20 
 An early but insightful point of view by Schumpeter (1942) is that more 
competition would erode the monopolistic rents, and thus reduce the incentive to 
undertake R&D activities.  We stand in line with this perspective and extend it to an 
economy in which R&D investment is used to control the pollution.  To be more 
specific, in our model the decentralized economy suffers from two market failures.  
The first concerns the environmental externality.  Pollution harms human health and 
productivity, but is not accounted for by the polluting firms.  The second has to do 
with the market imperfections regarding the supply of intermediate goods.  However, 
these imperfections can become the motivation for people to engage in R&D in the 
case where the polluting firms need to pay a license fee to use abatement technologies, 
but not in the case where there is public provision of free abatement knowledge.  In 
other words, only in the regime of private abatement (PA and PAR) can the second 
market failure (imperfect competition) remedy the first market failure (the 
environmental externality).  Based on this observation, market imperfections play a 
critical role when integrating abatement investment with private incentives. 
Fig. 1 exhibits the effects of varying the monopoly power parameter (θ ).  A 
rise in θ  is associated with an increase in both the balanced growth rate and the level 
of welfare under both the PA and PAR regimes.  To explain this result, by using Eqs. 
(29), (30) and 0Hpi =  we obtain HLs ωpi )1( −= , where a higher profit implies more 
employment of research workers.  As noted previously, the R&D firms can price 
their ideas exactly to extract all the profit of the intermediate firms.  For this reason, 
a higher θ  (as well as the profit of the intermediate firms) means that more 
resources are contributed to hire labor in the R&D sector, thereby stimulating the 
balanced growth rate.   
In the GA regime, on the contrary, the effects of θ  on the long-term growth rate 
and welfare are almost negligible.  The reason for this result stems from the fact that 
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in the GA regime abatement investment is undertaken only by the government, and 
thus has no direct relationship with the firms’ profit.  More specifically, the 
numerical results depicted in Fig. 1 indicate that, under both the PA and PAR regimes, 
the greater the degree of imperfect competition, the larger the benefit of private 
abatement will become.  When θ  is large enough, both the balanced growth rate 
and social welfare for the PA regime may possibly exceed those for the GA regime.  
Moreover, if the government can recycle its tax revenues to provide incentives for 
private abatement R&D, both economic growth and welfare will be further enhanced. 
4.2.2. The type of government spending 
 We now discuss the parameter related to the public sector.  In their recent study, 
Fullerton and Kim (2008) show that government spending on transfer payments (φ ) is 
a non-environmental parameter with important implications for environmental policy.  
The effect of changing φ  is depicted in Fig. 2.  It is shown that, in response to an 
increase in φ , the growth rate and social welfare decline in both the PAR and GA 
regimes but remain unchanged in the PA regime.  The intuition for this result is 
straightforward.  In the PA regime all tax revenues are returned to the households.  
The abatement investment which stirs up economic growth comes only from the 
monopolistic rents so that φ  has no role in economic activities.   
 However, under both the PAR and GA regimes, economic growth becomes 
closely related to φ  since the government uses its tax revenues to stimulate (or 
directly conduct) abatement R&D.  A positive value of φ  indicates that part of the 
revenues from the environmental tax must be spent on transfer payments.   The 
greater need for transfer payments implies that less tax revenue will be used in 
abatement R&D, and hence will lead to a deterioration in the balanced growth rate.  
As is evident, our results indicate that the conclusion in Fullerton and Kim (2008) is 
valid under both the PAR and GA regimes but invalid under the PA regime. 
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4.2.3. The effect of an environmental tax 
We now turn to investigate the effect of an environmental tax policy.  It is 
shown in Fig. 3 that raising an environmental tax can stimulate economic growth as 
well as reduce the level of pollution.  Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) have clearly 
pointed out the two opposing forces whereby the environmental policy affects the 
long-term growth rate.  First, a lower level of polluting inputs decreases the 
productivity of reproducible inputs, thereby lowering economic growth.  Second, a 
reduction in pollution improves the environmental quality, which benefits productivity 
and economic growth.  As a result, Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) suggest that the 
environmental tax has an ambiguous effect on economic growth.   
In our model, however, by referring to Eq. (6), the pollution inputs are purchased 
from abroad at a given price so that a higher environmental tax can simultaneously 
reduce the pollution )( ipp =  but keep the polluting inputs )( iee =  unchanged.  
Under such a situation, a tighter environmental policy no longer decreases the 
productivity of capital and labor, because a lower level of pollution in production is 
offset by more abatement knowledge.  Hence, our model only presents the second 
environmental quality effect. 
To highlight the importance of this environmental quality effect, we consider the 
alternative value 0=γ  to indicate that production gains no extra benefit from a 
better environmental quality.17  The numerical results are depicted in Fig. 4.  It can 
be seen that, in the absence of an environmental externality, raising an environmental 
tax has no effect on the long-term growth rate while it reduces pollution.  Comparing 
Fig. 3 with Fig. 4 enables us to realize that whether or not environmental policies 
affect economic growth crucially depends on the presence of a positive environmental 
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that γ=0 only removes the environmental externality in relation to production; 
nonetheless the externality in regard to the households’ utility is always present.  
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externality.   
 Now we deal with the welfare analysis.  Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show that the welfare 
level is increasing with the environmental tax, regardless of whether a positive 
environmental externality is present or not.  As discussed earlier, in the case of 
0=γ  a tighter environmental policy has no effect on long-term growth.  However, 
it can still influence the level of welfare because, with the growth rate unchanged, a 
higher environmental tax improves the environmental quality and thus unambiguously 
enhances the welfare level.  If the representative household does not care about the 
environmental quality ( 0=η ), it is an obvious conjecture that environmental tax 
cannot play any role either in governing the balanced growth rate or the welfare level. 
 
5. Discussions and extensions 
 In this section we provide two detailed discussions of previous settings which 
may need further debate.  The first one concerns the properties of the abatement 
technology, and the second one has to do with why our model makes a distinction 
between pollution emissions and dirty inputs.  In addition, we also conduct two 
interesting extensions.  In the first extension we examine the effects of the 
environmental tax under an alternative setting of pollution.  In the second extension 
we investigate the impact of an increase in tariffs that raises the price of pollution 
inputs.  
5.1. The properties of the abatement technology/knowledge 
5.1.1. What is the abatement technology/knowledge? 
 In our model, the concept of the abatement knowledge is not much different from 
that in the previous literature, such as Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) and 
Fullerton and Kim (2008).  It generally represents the amount of resources that the 
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economy has devoted to developing or applying the new technical knowledge which 
enables production to occur in a less polluting way.  As for practical concerns, the 
abatement technology might, as an example, refer to the CO2 capture and storage 
(CCS) system, and therefore the value of H  represents the available resources for 
the adoption of the CCS technology.  Within the model, a plausible way of thinking 
how the abatement technology works might be to consider that the intermediate firms 
are endowed with a common abatement machine, and that H  is concerned with the 
technology to operate it.  As such, a higher level of H  is associated with a superior 
technology, and hence leads the intermediate-goods firm to implement the abatement 
machine better so as to further reduce pollution. 
5.1.2. Non-rivalry 
 Gerlagh et al. (2008) establish an endogenous growth model incorporating the 
R&D, environmental policy and innovation policy.  In their model, there are many 
(intermediate) producers of abatement equipment.  The upstream R&D firm creates 
new ideas that expand the varieties of the intermediate producers, and then sells the 
new technology embodied in these rival goods.  It should be emphasized that our 
setting is different from theirs because in our model the variety of the intermediate 
goods is constant.  The role of market imperfection in this economy is to allow 
intermediate firms to have a positive profit such that they can pay for abatement R&D.  
New ideas, the products of R&D, are about the technology/knowledge used to abate 
pollution, which are featured with non-rivalry due to the property of knowledge.  It 
is not specific for each intermediate good and thus could be used by all intermediate 
firms once produced.  Due to non-rivalry, when the R&D firm produces the 
state-of-the-art technology H , it sells the same blueprint to each and all of the 
intermediate firms.  After paying for H , an intermediate firm has the right to use 
that technology forever, but for the next period it has to pay another fee for the right 
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to use newly-generated technology.  In other words, in each period the firms pay for 
new technology H , but use the whole of the existing stock of technology H  to 
abate pollution.   
5.1.3. Incentives and indivisible technology 
 It is worth discussing the incentives (or necessity) to use the abatement 
technology.  First of all, we need to explain why intermediate firms must pay all of 
their profits to buy the abatement technology.  In line with the literature on 
R&D-based endogenous growth including Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), the 
upstream R&D firms have the pricing power to determine the price of their blueprints.  
Specifically, the R&D firms unilaterally determine the price of their innovations, and 
the intermediate firms then determine whether or not to buy blueprints.  Therefore, 
the R&D sector will charge a price that fully extracts the profits of the midstream 
firms. 
 We then turn to explain why the intermediate firms could not choose to use 
divisible technology.  This specification can be justified by the following two 
economic rationales.  The first rationale is that the government enforces the 
utilization of the latest abatement technology by, for example, imposing stricter 
pollution standards.  This regulation forces the firms to leave the market if they stop 
using the latest abatement technology.18  The second rationale is that we can assume 
that the technology generated in each instance has a property of indivisibility.  This 
assumption rules out the possibility that the intermediate firm chooses to use a 
partition of H .  More specifically, for the intermediate firm, there are only two 
choices: to accept the price of the blueprint and use the indivisible technology, or to 
                                                 
18
 It would be interesting to further examine the effect of this kind of regulation on macroeconomic 
performance.  However, due to the space constraint, we would like to leave this to a future study.  
For an analysis on the implementation of the optimal path in a growing economy with pollution permits, 
see, for example, Grimaud (1999). 
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reject the price of the blueprint and stop using the abatement technology (and thus 
leave the market).19  The indivisibility of the abatement technology stems from the 
fact that new technology and old existing technology are often highly correlated.  If 
a firm does not buy all of the new technology in this period, it will be very costly for 
it to utilize (upgrade to) the newest technology in the next period.  To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that this cost is too high to be considered.  Hence, the firms 
actually confront an all-or-nothing decision regarding the use of the technology.  
5.2. The distinction between pollution emissions and dirty inputs 
 In our model, as mentioned above, a fixed import price of polluting inputs ( m ) is 
the key to screening out the traditional negative policy effect on long-term growth in 
the literature.  Hence, it is worthwhile discussing why we need to make a distinction 
between pollution emissions and dirty inputs, and to introduce m  into our model.  
Theoretically, although numerous studies model pollution based on the concept of a 
“dirty input”, there are several reasons for treating them differently.20  First, pollution 
(i.e., dirty air, messy water or noise) is not directly used in the production process, 
while the dirty inputs (i.e., petroleum or chemicals) are.  Second, abatement 
knowledge can hardly play any role in the pollution transformation process if we mix 
the two.  Third, and most importantly, pollution harms human health but is not 
internalized by the private agents and thus needs to be priced by the government, 
while dirty inputs should be priced by the market, because they are production factors 
just like other clean inputs.  Hence, we allow for Pτ  and m  to denote, respectively, 
the price of pollution and dirty inputs.   
                                                 
19
 Once a firm stops using abatement technology, as time goes on, the burden of the environmental tax 
will become infinitely large, thereby leading the intermediate firms to have a negative profit and 
forcing them to leave the market. 
20
 Some studies (e.g., Ligthart and van der Ploeg, 1994; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; and Bréchet and 
Michel, 2007), on the other hand, treat pollution as a by-product of capital or final output.  However, 
under such a situation, since an environmental tax levied on pollution is equivalent to that levied on 
physical capital or output, it might be difficult to tell whether economic growth is affected by an 
environmental tax or by a similar capital (output) tax. 
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 To be more specific, supposing that there is no polluting input price, from Eqs. 
(5)-(7) and 1=q  (the zero-profit condition in the final good sector) we have: 
  iPyiiyiiii plrklHpkNA τωpi
βααεα
−−−=
−− 1)1()( .     (38) 
One implication stemming from Eq. (38) is that, in the absence of any policy 
interference ( 0=Pτ ), the cost of pollution becomes zero so that the intermediate 
firms will use an infinitely large level of pollution.  As a result, the environmental 
quality declines to the bottom and the economy cannot survive even temporarily.  To 
this end, we introduce such a “non-policy” cost of polluting inputs to restrict the 
pollution to within a finite level even in the absence of an environmental tax.  To be 
concerned with practicality, since firms usually import petroleum from abroad at a 
price that they can not bargain for, we believe that the assumption of a given price of 
polluting inputs is not very far from the real world. 
5.3. An alternative pollution setting 
 There are some studies introducing a private cost of pollution in order to prevent 
pollution from growing to infinity in the absence of policy intervention; see, e.g., 
Jouvet et al. (2005) and Ono (2007).  The main departure between these studies and 
our paper is that they do not make a distinction between pollution emissions and dirty 
inputs.  Therefore, raising the environmental tax leads to a negative impact on 
growth.  In this subsection, we examine the effects of the environmental tax under 
such an alternative setting of pollution.   
 To simplify the analysis and highlight the negative growth effect, we temporarily 
remove the role of abatement technology.  By denoting z  as the private cost of 
pollution, the profit function of an intermediate firm can now be expressed as:  
  ( , ) ( )i i i i yi i yi P iq A N K k p l rk l z pα ν βpi ω τ= − − − + .     (39) 
Notice that in ( , )A N K , it is assumed that, in line with the approach adopted in Ono 
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(2007), the main force that drives economic growth is the capital externality. 
 With this specification, we then reexamine the growth and welfare effects of an 
environmental tax.  The detailed process is provided in Appendix B.  Table 3a 
depicts the numerical results in association with a sufficiently greater ecological 
regeneration and a sufficiently smaller environmental externality on production (i.e., 
b =0.04  and γ =0.77);   As indicated in Table 3a, when τ  is increased from 15 
to 60, pollution directly declines in response (from 0.000341 to 0.000209), which 
generates two opposing growth effects.  First, a better environmental quality is 
beneficial to input productivity, and thus tends to stimulate the growth rate.  Second, 
fewer pollution inputs in the production function lower the marginal productivity of 
capital, which is harmful to the growth rate.  Under our calibrated economy the latter 
effect outweighs the former, so that the growth rate declines from 3.55% to 3.40%.  
As for the welfare effect, the household’s utility gains from a cleaner environment but 
suffers from a lower growth rate.  Again, the latter effect exceeds the former, leading 
to a negative overall welfare effect of the environmental tax (from -2.7910 to 
-3.6619).   
 Nevertheless, if the environmental externality in production is very important, it 
is also possible that the beneficial effect of a better environment outweighs the 
harmful effect resulting from the decrease in the marginal productivity of capital.  As 
exhibited in Table 3b, with a sufficiently small ecological regeneration and a 
sufficiently large environmental externality on production (i.e., b =0.004 and 
γ =0.99), the first effect may dominate the second effect and hence the environmental 
tax tends to boost the growth rate.  This result reveals the fact that the environmental 
tax can still stimulate the growth rate under this alternative pollution setting. 
 
 29 
 
Table 3b : An alternative pollution setting ( 0.004b = , 0.99γ = ) 
 Pollution Growth rate (%) Welfare 
15τ =  0.000313 2.978 -7.8225 
20τ =  0.000294 2.997 -7.5862 
25τ =  0.000278 3.012 -7.3901 
30τ =  0.000263 3.024 -7.2265 
35τ =  0.000249 3.034 -7.0893 
40τ =  0.000237 3.041 -6.9739 
45τ =  0.000226 3.048 -6.8765 
50τ =  0.000216 3.052 -6.7943 
55τ =  0.000207 3.056 -6.7248 
60τ =  0.000198 3.058 -6.6662 
5.4. The impact of a tariff 
 Our previous analysis focuses on the effects of the environmental tax that is 
levied on pollution emissions.  Given our different treatment of pollution emissions 
and dirty inputs, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of a tariff which 
influences the prices of the polluting inputs.  To this end, in this subsection we 
assume that the government implements a tariff rate fτ  on dirty inputs.  Therefore, 
the profit function of the ith intermediate firm ipi  stated in Eq. (6) is modified as: 
Table 3a : An alternative pollution setting ( 0.04b = , 0.77γ = ) 
 Pollution Growth rate (%) Welfare 
15τ =  0.000341 3.547 -2.7910 
20τ =  0.000319 3.527 -2.9048 
25τ =  0.000299 3.508 -3.0135 
30τ =  0.000282 3.490 -3.1175 
35τ =  0.000267 3.472 -3.2173 
40τ =  0.000253 3.456 -3.3131 
45τ =  0.000240 3.440 -3.4052 
50τ =  0.000229 3.425 -3.4939 
55τ =  0.000218 3.411 -3.5794 
60τ =  0.000209 3.397 -3.6619 
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  (1 )i i i i f i yi P iq y rk me l ppi τ ω τ= − − + − − ,      (40) 
Accordingly, the term f meτ  needs to be added to the government budget constraints 
under different regimes, i.e., Eqs, (19), (31) and (34), on the right-hand-side. 
 
 
 Table 4 reports the summary results of the changes in relevant variables in 
response to distinctive tariff rates on dirty inputs.  It is found that, under all the three 
regimes, raising the tariff on dirty inputs tends to reduce the growth rate, the level of 
pollution, and the level of social welfare.  Intuitively speaking, raising the tariff has 
several mixed effects.  First, since the tariff rate is levied on e  instead of p , it 
directly lowers the use of dirty inputs.  On the one hand, this improves the 
environmental quality, while on the other hand it reduces the marginal productivity of 
capital and thus harms the growth rate.  Second, an increase in the tariff boosts the 
tax revenues, which means that more resources are devoted to environmental R&D 
under GA and PAR, generating an additional beneficial effect on growth and welfare.  
Third, under PA and PAR, a higher tariff reduces the profits of intermediate firms, 
causing fewer resources to be directed towards environmental R&D.  It is obvious 
that the net effect depends upon the extent of these three effects.  However, with our 
parameter values, the negative growth-impeding effect always dominates under all 
Table 4 : The impact of a tariff 
 GA PA PAR 
 P  g (%) W  P  g (%) W  P  g (%) W  
0fτ =  0.00420 3.116 -2.900 0.00358 1.427 -14.717 0.00429 3.554 -0.639 
0.01fτ =  0.00417 3.108 -2.985 0.00355 1.413 -14.882 0.00425 3.536 -0.766 
0.02fτ =  0.00414 3.099 -3.070 0.00353 1.400 -15.048 0.00422 3.518 -0.892 
0.03fτ =  0.00411 3.091 -3.155 0.00351 1.386 -15.213 0.00419 3.500 -1.020 
0.04fτ =  0.00408 3.082 -3.241 0.00349 1.372 -15.379 0.00415 3.482 -1.148 
0.05fτ =  0.00405 3.074 -3.328 0.00346 1.359 -15.546 0.00412 3.463 -1.277 
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three regimes.  As a result, we find that a decline in the growth rate and welfare is 
coupled with a rise in environmental quality.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring an environmental 
externality, abatement R&D, and market imperfections.  The salient trait of the 
model is that it is able to deal with three distinct regimes including public abatement, 
private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling.  
Some main findings are obtained from our numerical analysis.  First, there exists a 
trade-off between economic growth and environmental quality in a “regime selection” 
sense.  Second, the benefit arising from the private conduct of abatement becomes 
larger the greater the degree of the firms’ monopoly power.  This potentially implies 
that antitrust policies might in some way reduce growth and welfare in a private 
abatement R&D model.  Third, if the government recycles the environmental tax 
revenues to subsidize private abatement R&D, the growth rate and welfare will be 
higher than in almost all other regimes.  Fourth, the beneficial effects of public 
abatement policies will be eroded when government spending on transfer payments 
increases. 
 The effects of environmental tax policies are also investigated in this paper.  We 
show that a rise in the environmental tax could possibly simultaneously reduce 
pollution and stimulate growth if the intermediate firms import polluting inputs from 
abroad at a fixed price.  However, care should be taken regarding the implications 
because such a desirable result is in part due to the rigidity of the polluting input price.  
If the import price can be adjusted endogenously, the above result should be modified 
as well.  
Although our model indicates that an environmental tax policy is beneficial to 
 32 
economic growth, we would like to mention that this result should be accepted with 
some caution.  In fact, our main intention is not to emphasize the beneficial effect of 
an environmental tax on economic growth, but to highlight the importance of distinct 
pricing between pollution emissions and polluting inputs.  Doing so will be helpful 
for us to clarify the two channels through which an environmental tax influences the 
long-term growth rate, i.e., the (negative) traditional productivity effect and the 
(positive) Bovenberg-Smulders environmental quality effect.  
 Some remaining extensions could be considered in future research.  First, in this 
paper R&D firms can extract all of their buyers’ profit via their unilateral 
determination of the license fee.  It would be interesting to consider the case where 
the license fee for abatement knowledge is decided by a Nash-bargaining process 
between R&D firms and intermediate firms instead of by R&D firms only.  Second, 
the price of polluting inputs is not internalized in this paper.  It would be natural to 
extend our model by proposing a channel to endogenize the polluting input price.  
For instance, we could introduce an additional domestic energy sector, or assume a 
nonlinear adjustment cost of polluting inputs.  These extensions inevitably 
complicate the model, but they deserve future study.  
 
Appendix A 
This appendix provides a detailed derivation of Eqs. (33) and (35) in the main 
text.  In the PA regime, by substituting the intermediate firm’s first-order conditions 
reported in Eqs. (10)-(12) into the profit function, we obtain: 
  [ ] εεεαθβαθpi mHPY )1()1)(1())(1(1 −−−−−+−−= .   (A1) 
Based on HHg /=  and Eq. (30), we have HqHH H// pi= .  Then, putting Eqs. 
(12), (17), (20) and HqHH H// pi=  together, we can derive: 
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  ω
δpi
==
H
Hg

.            (A2) 
Substituting Eq. (A1) into (A2) yields: 
  
[ ]
ω
εδ
βθ
εαθβαθδ εmHPLg y )1()1(
)1)(1())(1(1 −
−
−
−−−+−−
= .  (A3) 
By substituting the relevant variables along the balanced growth equilibrium into Eq. 
(A3) and being reminded that KHh /=  and Kw /ω= , we can obtain Eq. (33) in 
the main text.  
 In the PAR regime, from Eqs. (17), (30) and the zero-profit condition we have 
ωδpi )1/( sg −= . Similar to the derivation of Eq. (33) in the PA regime, we can obtain 
Eq. (35) in the main text.  
 
Appendix B 
 This appendix deals with the growth and welfare effects of an environmental tax 
under the alternative pollution setting proposed by Jouvet et al. (2005) and Ono 
(2007).  Given the profit function reported in Eq. (39), the intermediate firm’s 
first-order conditions with 1iq =  and the symmetric conditions are given by: 
  
1(1 ) ( , ) yA N K K P L rα ν βθ α −− = ,        (A4) 
  
1(1 ) ( , ) y PA N K K P L zα ν βθ ν τ−− = + ,       (A5) 
  
1(1 ) ( , ) yA N K K P Lα ν βθ β ω−− = .        (A6) 
To ensure sustainable growth, we must assume that, in addition to the environmental 
externality, the productivity function ( )A ⋅  also contains the capital externality (as in 
Ono, 2007).  Specifically, ( )A ⋅  is specified to be of the form: 
  
1( , )A N K XN Kγ α−= ,          (A7) 
where X  is a productivity parameter.  Moreover, it is required that the private cost 
of pollution z  evolve with capital, i.e., z zK=  where z  is a constant.  The tax 
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revenues are all returned to the households and thus the resource constraint can be 
easily derived as K Y C= − . 
 Under such a situation, Eqs. (22) and (26) should be modified as: 
  
1 (1 )(1 )K yg XN P Lγ ν βτ θ α ρσ
∗ ∗ ∗ = − − −  ,      (A8) 
  yc XN P L g
γ ν β∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
= − .          (A9) 
 It should be noted that, given the fact that we remove the abatement technology 
sector, all the endowed labor supply L  is devoted to the intermediate good, implying 
that yL L=  is true.  The macro economy along the BGP can then be described by 
yL L= , Eqs. (A4)-(A6), (A8), (A9) and (27), which determine seven unknowns: ∗c , 
∗P , ∗N , ∗yL , 
∗w , *r  and ∗g .  As for the parameter values, we set 0 60z = , 
1L = , 0.772X = , 0.05ν =  (see Agnani et al., 2005) such that the balanced growth 
rate is 3.5%.  Furthermore, the monopoly power index is adjusted to 0.005θ =  to 
match the profit ratio 4%.  In Table 3a, the parameters regarding the environment are 
set the same as in Section 4 as ( , ) (0.04,0.77)b γ = .  In Table 3b, however, to 
highlight the importance of ecological regeneration and the environmental externality 
in production, we adjust the two parameters as ( , ) (0.004,0.99)b γ = .  All other 
parameter values not mentioned above are the same as those used in Section 4.  With 
these parameter values, Tables 3a and 3b show how the calibrated values of 
macroeconomic variables will react in association with the environmental tax τ  
under different extents of ecological regeneration and the environmental externality. 
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Figure 1. The effect of monopoly power 
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Figure 2. The effect of increasing other government spending 
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Figure 3. The effect of an environmental tax ( 0.77γ = ) 
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Figure 4. The effect of an environmental tax ( 0γ = ) 
 
 
 
 
   
